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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to measure the influence of financial leverage, earnings
management (modified Jones model), women on board (percentage), and size of the
board on the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure by corporations in
Indonesia. The ESG disclosure data used in this research are from Bloomberg database
covering the period of 5 years, from 2012 to 2016. The method analysis used in this
study is multiple linear regression, while the data is processed using Gretl software. The
results show that the financial leverage, earnings management, and women on board
(percentage) negatively influence the ESG disclosure practice, while the size of the
board influences positively on ESG disclosure. The research limitations are the sample
of companies in the Bloomberg ESG disclosure database. This research extends from
previous studies conducted on the inclusion of ESG disclosure in Indonesia.
Keywords: corporate governance, disclosure, ESG, Bloomberg
1. Introduction
Indonesia is currently entering the era of Industry 4.0 that allows for easier and faster
exchanges of information. Industry 4.0 will cause changes in activities that were previ-
ously isolated into greater automation, with products that will optimally integrate while
data flowing into the global value chain (Strange and Zucchella 2017).
One of the aspects of sustainability that focuses on sustainable development is
defined as development which meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (United Nations World
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). For that reason, the practice of
sustainability reporting must result in the management thinking and actions that pursue
sustainability (Bradford, Earp, Williams, 2017). In order for external stakeholders benefit
from corporate sustainability reporting, including the socially-responsible investors,
information presented in the report have to be organized according to the utilization
of information to make business decisions. (Mohammed, Ahmed and Xu-Dong Ji, 2017).
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For now, investors are presented with the options to choose between traditional
financial-oriented investing and ESG-oriented sustainable investing (Olmedo, Lirio,
Torres and Izquierdo, 2017). Good corporate governance practice and financial reporting
background will stimulate the performance of capital market to improve investor’s
confidence (Mohammed et al., 2017).
CSR have increasingly drawn the attention of customers investors, suppliers, and gov-
ernments from all over the world (Kabir and Thai, 2017). To that end, many companies are
getting more interested in reporting their corporate social responsibilies or initiate their
CSR activities (Setiawan, 2016). Furthermore, business is also increasingly competitive
with easier and more integrated access, resulting in companies trying to get ahead in
implementing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Olmedo et al., 2017).
A good CSR performance is when CSR activities conducted by companies corre-
spond to the stakeholder’s expectations. These stakeholder’s will in turn give a positive
response if they are in agreement with the purposes of a company in implementing CSR
(Setiawan, 2016). CSR disclosure becomes an attempt to communicate that the company
is not merely established to maximize profits but also to achieve a long-term goal to
secure company’s sustainability (Isnalita and Narsa, 2017).
There are several decisions that a company has to make in regards to the public
disclosure of its CSR information, including balancing its obligation to comply with the
regulations, establishing its corporate image and implementing good corporate gover-
nance (Setiawan, 2016). Several past researches have employed a different approach in
measuring CSR performance, which is by using the scores and ratings from sustainability
index, CSR rating institution or CSR information providers. However, few are arguing on
the validity and reliability of the tools, including the Socially Responsible Investment
(SRI) Metrix, and the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) sustainability criteria
(Saadaoui and Soobaroyen, 2018).
This research uses ESG parameters in measuring CSR performance as the disclosure
requirements and the strength and quality of each institution vary. ESG is believed to
be able to predict and assess CSR performance specifically on each company (Bradford
et al., 2017).
According to Bajic and Yurtoglu (2018), ESG can capture significant impacts of CSR on
companies that drive a correlation between social aspect of CSR and company’s value.
Systematic ESG information can be used by professional investors as an investment
analysis tool.
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This research contributes to the CSR disclosures as it is based on a third-party rating
by measuring the extent of disclosures covered by Bloomberg to determine which infor-
mation are attractive to each related stakeholder in relation to those specific aspects. In
Bloomberg methodology, each important data disclosure is measured. ESG disclosure
scoring includes CSR disclosure items in relation to the industry (Giannarkis, Konteos
and Sariannidis, 2014).
The purpose of this research is to assess factors that influence Environmental, Social
and Governance (ESG) disclosure by companies in Indonesia. This research will discuss
the Information Asymmetry and Governance of Corporate Social Responsible Disclosure
in Indonesia. The indicators used in the research are from Environmental, Social and
Governance (ESG) index. ESG indicators that are related to the environmental, social
and governance aspects will be further discussed in this research.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Corporate social responsibility (CSR)
Companies are trying to adopt CSR governance mechanism to achieve their social and
environmental goals and to establish legitimacy in the community and business (Wang
and Sarkis, 2017). Corporate social and environmental responsibility emerges in many
companies as an important element of their corporate strategic direction and component
of risk management (Al-Shaer, Salama and Toms, 2017).
Companies utilize different reporting tools in communicating their CSR initiatives to
the stakeholder’s. However, companies are unable to consider all stakeholder’s equally
and communicate to them with the same intensity (Giannarkis et al., 2014).
CSR is a concept to manage organizations profitably in a socially and environmentally
responsible way to achieve business sustainability and stakeholder satisfaction (Vollero,
Palazzo, Siano and Sardanelli, 2018).
Rigorous CSR governance can result in excellent implementation of CSR, through
proper allocation of resources and transformation of business structures (Wang and
Sarkis, 2017). Results from excellent CSR implementation will help companies in achiev-
ing and maintaining their social legitimacy and contributing to the improvements of their
business and financial performance (Wang and Sarkis, 2017).
For this reason, in order that sustainability reporting canmeet the needs of the compa-
nies external people, including the socially-responsible investors, information presented
in the report must be able to be used in making business decisions (Bradford, et.al.,
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2017). Companies are expected to disclose more information to the public in order that
companies canmeet the information needs of the stakeholder’s. CSR shapes the relation
between a company and the stakeholder’s because CSR can predict the company value
(Bajic and Yurtoglu, 2018).
To achieve the quality of CSR management that can influence a positive market
response, corporate governance becomes an important key for a company. Stake-
holder’s, related corporate goals are related to different expectations that need to be
prioritized (Velte, 2016).
2.2. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
ESG score is used as a complementary to the corporate financial score, improving accu-
racy in risk performance and assessment (Achima and Borlea, 2015). Viewed as com-
prehensive information, ESG comprises corporate sustainability performance and rep-
resents information that shows whether a company has worked toward the goals of
sustainability (Bradford et al., 2017).
Integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria during an asset
evaluation process is widely used by socially-responsible investors. Hence, through
ESG, companies are expected to provide detailed information on the companies
achievements (Olmedo et al., 2017).
From Bloomberg’s ESG scoring, companies can assess their corporate practice in the
aspects of Environmental, Social and Governance according to the publicly available
data, annual report and sustainability report, direct communication, press release, third-
party study and the news. The more information disclosed by a company the higher its
ESG scores. It displays higher company’s commitment toward transparency and account-
ability (Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 2017).
Environmental performance refers to the use of good environmental practices, such
as implementing pollution control measures, making environmental investments, and
setting environmental policies. Social performance refers to community investment, such
as equal employment opportunities, and other social aspects related to internal and
external stakeholders. Governance performance refers to the use of good corporate
governance practices, such as CEO separation and the role of board chairman and
diversity in board membership, which ensures that companies make decisions for the
benefit of shareholders (Husted and Filho, 2016).
In this research, ESG performance is measured by using ESG score, according to
data from Bloomberg and corporate annual reports from 2012 up to 2016. Bloomberg
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measures the extent of CSR disclosure through three different categories, including
environmental, social and governance, by using ESG score (Giannarkis et al., 2014).
Different from other literary reviews that consider specific information sources, such
as web site or annual report, to build the disclosure index, Bloomberg’s methodology
combines sources of information more broadly, including CSR reports, annual reports,
corporate web sites and Bloomberg’s surveys. (Giannarkis et al., 2014). ESG factors offer
long- term performance advantages for potential investors once integrated into investing
analysis and decision-making (Olmedo et al., 2017).
2.3. Agency theory
Agency Theory describes conflicts arising in a company as a result of separation
between the owners (principal) and the management (agent) (Eisenhard, 1989). Further,
it explains that there is conflict of interests between the principal (shareholders) and
the agent (management) (Eisenhard, 1989). Separation between the owners and the
management can create agency conflict due to differences in the interests and goals of
each individual party.
Conflicts between principal and agent emerge in various forms, including manipula-
tion of financial information, committing accounting frauds and expropriating sharehold-
ers’ wealth. For that reason, a strong corporate governancemechanism is needed tomit-
igate the consequences of these conflicts. Corporate governance mechanism requires
accounting numbers to be used as tools by the board of directors to monitor and control
system (Mohammed et al., 2017).
This is important as shareholder’s expect to maximize their profits, while the manage-
ment might be more interested in their own profits. To that end, the board of directors
might need to play an important role in monitoring the management’s Agency Theory
describes conflicts arising in a company as a result of separation between the owners
(principal) and the management (agent) (Eisenhard, 1989).
2.4. Legitimacy theory
Legitimacy theory explains that each organization needs to ensure that it has operated
within the standards, limitations, or policies set by the communities where it becomes
a part of (Deegan, 2000). By applying this theory, a company will voluntarily report
all activities, if the management sees that certain activities become the community’s
interest.
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Based on the legitimacy theory, ESG is not only focused on stakeholders needs and
alignment of interests, but also focused on some socially constructed system of norms,
values and beliefs (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995; Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2014).
Corporate governance must ensure that disclosures are done timely and accurately
on all material topics on the company, including financial position, performance, owner-
ship and corporate governance. The board of directors will set strict rules, designed to
protect the company’s interests, in the areas of financial reporting, internal control and
risk management (Achima and Borlea, 2015).
According to Rouf (2018), there is a negative relationship between liquidity and lever-
age of a company. Liquidity is the company’s ability to gather short-term obligations.
The previous researches, based on legitimacy (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Cormier
and Gordon, 2001; Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui, 2013), and stakeholder theory (Orlitzky
and Benjamin, 2001; Van Der Laan, Van Eesand Van Witteloostuijn, 2008; Al-Shaer
et al., 2017), taken from political economy theory, have improved our understanding of
corporate social responsibility accounting, and this approach can be complemented by
positivist methods, whether routine or more nuanced (Gray and Laughlin, 2012; Al-Shaer
et al., 2017).
Companies with increased vulnerability due to their size or industry disclose more
information voluntarily as a way to manage. There are many similarities between stake-
holder’s theory and legitimacy theory that can explain the reason a company might
choose to make a certain set of voluntary disclosures legitimacy (Kuo and Yi-Ju Chen,
2013; Al-Shaer et al., 2017).
More specifically, companies can respond to the stakeholder’s expectations by inte-
grating disclosure into the company’s strategy to reflect the ‘real commitment’ or its
alternative only by doing the minimum to maintain a certain level of legitimacy, which
may become tactical or a symbolic legitimacy (Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Al-Shaer et al.,
2017). Financial Leverage
According to (McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis, 1988), companies with low CSR
level can have an increase in the company’s financial risk due to lack of social respon-
sibility initiatives. In contrast, companies that present high level of CSR disclosure face
lower financial risks and establish a more stable relationship with the government and
financial community.
According to Berger and Humphrey, (1997), managers tend to maintain a low debt
level in order to have wider options in making investment decisions. Leverage refers
to the amount of debt used to finance company assets and business operations other
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than capital. Leverage can be used as an efficient control mechanism to avoid excessive
income reporting practices by management which will ultimately harm the company.
According to Andrade and Kaplan (1998), high corporate leverage causes the com-
pany’s financial risk to be higher such as financial difficulties, payment failure, debt and
bankruptcy risk. According to Jensen (1991) argues that the formation of new regulations
and a declining economic crisis have a significant influence on high corporate leverage.
Thus, the higher the debt ratio, the greater the risk, and the higher the interest rate
(Ghazali, Shafie and Sanusi, 2015).
The level of leverage tends to affect earnings management both positively and neg-
atively. The tendency to avoid violations of debt agreements by companies results in
higher earnings management by these companies (Maheswari and Agrawal, 2015).
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) stated that financial leverage influences negatively to
the extent of socially responsible disclosures on the internet. Low levels of financial
leverage reassure that creditors will not intervening managers decision related CSR
disclosure initiatives (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008)
H1: Financial leverage influences negatively to the Environmental, Social and Gover-
nance (ESG).
2.5. Earnings management
Corporate Social Responsibility is often used as a defensive tool to avoid negative reac-
tions and surveillance from the stakeholders who affected by earnings management,
thereby the manager’s position in the company allowing managers to acting in their
own interest (Prior, Surroca and Tribo, 2008; Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2014). Earnings
management can reduces the reputation of companies and leads to loss of reputation
of the individual managers responsible for overseeing the reports at the time when
accounting scandals or aggressive earnings management practices revealed (Zahra,
Priem and Rasheed, 2005; Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2014).
Earnings management is applied when managers use valuations in financial and
transaction reporting to change the financial statements in order to mislead some
stakeholders on the company’s economic performance or to influence the outcome of a
contract that depends on the accounting numbers reported (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
The level of CSR disclosure of a company is related to the level of its transparency.
Therefore, by employing CSR, the company becomes more transparent and trusted by
stakeholders.
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CSR activities have increased with the rapid growth of the stock market which has
led to increased demand for transparency (Kabir and Thai, 2017). Earnings management
can reduce transparency when related information on earnings management is not fully
disclosed. Quality of earnings quality will be considered better if the score of earnings
management gets smaller, while the ESG score is higher. Here, social responsibility
disclosure plays an important role and a complementary role in reducing information
asymmetry (Zhong and Gao, 2017).
Information asymmetry explains the presence or absence of information gaps
between the shareholders and the management. Information asymmetry is related to
earnings management, which becomes a variable of the quality of earnings. According
to Velte (2016), information on sustainability contributes in reducing the occurrence of
information asymmetry and the transaction costs due to agency relations between the
stakeholders and the company.
A good disclosure of ESG can improve the company’s reputation, so that the prac-
tice of earnings management carried out by the company is ignored by stakeholders
(Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2014)
H2: Earnings management negatively influences the Environmental, Social and Gover-
nance (ESG)
2.6. Women on board
According to Giannarkis et al. (2014), the presence of women directors positively influ-
ences CSR disclosure as it brings a unique perspective, experience and work style
compared to themale directors. The presence of women can also increase CSR rankings
and the company’s reputation by communicating an important signal to the investors that
display the potential financial performance.
A high percentage of women on board positively influences the level of social disclo-
sure which shows that women are more sensitive to social issues. Thus, the company
is sending a signal to the socially-responsible stakeholders on the intention to integrate
CSR initiatives into the company’s business processes. The board leadership structure
tends to significantly influence the level of social disclosure (Giannarkis et al., 2014).
Humphries and Whelan (2017) discover that the proportion of women on the board is
lower in countries with high power distance due to lack of regulatory requirements.
In a high power distance culture, recommendations on the gender composition of the
board of directors are not considered important, because everyone knows their place.
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Traditional gender roles show that women will not be well represented on company
boards. The higher the power distance, the less likely the requirements related to gender
composition of the board of directors (Humphries and Whelan, 2017).
H3: Women in board negatively influences the Environmental, Social and Governance
(ESG)
2.7. Size of the board
Size of the board becomes an important dimension of corporate governance (Ali, 2018).
According to Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998), small sized companies are more
efficient than large-sized companies, as the larger size of a company is characterized
by a slow bureaucratic decision process; therefore, less effective in overseeing CEO
actions.
According to Humphries and Whelan (2017), in a culture of high individualism, the
board will appear more legitimate if it can represent the interests of various individuals
or stakeholders.
The size of the company tends to influence the level of earnings management both
positively and negatively. Larger companies are in a better position to manage profits by
using a complex financial structure. On the other hand, companies are also subject to
a higher supervision and tend to refrain from engaging in higher earnings management
(Maheswari and Agrawal, 2015).
H4: Size of the Board positively influences the Environmental, Social and Governance
(ESG)
3. Research Methodology
This research is conducted to measure the influence of independent variables, namely
earnings management (modified Jones model), women in board (percentage) and size
of the board, as well as financial leverage on the dependent variable, namely environ-
mental, social and governance (ESG).
This research uses an analysis model in the form of the following scheme:
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 159
3rd ICEEBA
Figure 1: Research model.
3.1. Sample and data
The type of data used in this study is quantitative data. Details of data and sources used,
including: financial leverage, revenue, total assets, property, plant and equipment, net
income, cash flow from operations, total accruals, percentage of women in board, size
of the board and ESG score obtained from financial statements of companies listed on
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) through the Indonesian Stock Exchange website
(www.idx.co.id) and Bloomberg database. This research uses documentation method to
collect company financial report data from 2012 to 2016.
The unit of analysis in this research is the company level, while the model is multiple
linear regression. Data testing is required to ensure that available data can be used
to test the model that has been formulated in order that the hypothesis that has been
proposed can be tested. The data in this study will be analyzed using Gretl and SPSS
software.
The research population are companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)
from 2012 until 2016. The initial population was 80 companies; however, only 27 com-
panies passed the criteria of five years of observation, that is, the period 2012-2016.
The sampling technique used in this study is purposive judgment sampling:
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Table 1: Sample criteria.
Sample Criteria Total
Total companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange from 2012-2016
582 companies
Total companies with ESG score 80 companies
Total companies with incomplete ESG report (53) companies
Total companies that become samples of the research 27 companies
Total observation period 5 years
Total observation data 135 observations
3.2. Equations
Based on the analysis model, we form a model that will be tested with the multiple linear
regression. The analysis model is expressed in simple mathematical equation, as follow:
ESG = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 BZ − 𝛽2%WB − 𝛽3 LEV − 𝛽4 EM + 𝜖
Notes:
ESG = Environmental, social and governance
EM = Earnings management
%WB = %Women on board
BZ = Size of the board
LEV = Financial Leverage
α = Constant




ESG Score The extent of three different categories of CSR
disclosure (Environmental, Social and Governance)
Financial Leverage The scale of average total assets to average total
common equity firm’s capital structure
Earnings Management Earnings Management modified Jones model
Women on board Percentage of women on board
Size of the board The number of board members
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3.4. Earnings management (calculation using modified
Jones Model)
In earnings management calculation, we use the Modified Jones Model because this
model is considered the best model for detection of earnings management compared
to other models and provides the most powerful results (Dechow.PM, Sloan.GG and
Sweeney.AP, 1995).
The steps taken in calculating are as follows:
1. Calculate total accruals = Net income – Cash flow from operation














TA it = Total accrual in year t for company i
A it-1 = Total assets in year t–1 minus income in year t–1 for companies i
Δ REV it = Revenue in year t minus income in year t–1 for company i
Δ REC it = Receivables in year t minus receivables in year t–1 for companies i
PPE it = Gross property, plant and equipment
α, α2, α3 = regression coefficient
4. Results of Research and Analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Research’s Descriptive Statistics Variables.
Variable Min Max Mean S.D.
ESG Disclosure 6.61 54.1 24.2 13.5
Financial Lev 1.16 15.0 2.34 1.62
EM –0.000264 0.000228 4.89e-021 7.43e–005
Women on Board 0.00 0.333 0.0607 0.102
Size of the Board 3.00 12.0 5.90 2.04
Source: Output Gretl.
From Table 2 above, the main dependent variable, that is, ESG Disclosure, of the
company research samples has an average value of 24.2 with a standard deviation of
13.5. The highest score on ESG Disclosure is 54, belongs to SMCB in 2014. Meanwhile,
the lowest score on ESG Disclosure is 6.6, belongs to BMTR in 2015.
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In the financial leverage independent variable of the research sample companies, the
average value is 2.34 with a standard deviation of 1.62. The highest score on financial
leverage is 15,belongs to TBIG 2016. Meanwhile, the lowest score on financial leverage
is 1.16, belongs to INTP in 2015.
In the earnings management independent variable of the research sample compa-
nies, the average value is 4.89e-021 with a standard deviation of 7.43e-005. The highest
score on earnings management is 0,000228, belongs to AKRA in 2013. Meanwhile, the
lowest score on earning management is -0,000264, belongs to HEXA in 2016.
In the women in board independent variable of the research sample companies, the
average value is 0.0607 with a standard deviation of 0.102. The highest score on women
in board is 0.333, belongs to PWON in 2014, 2015, 2016 and GGRM in 2013. Meanwhile,
the lowest score on women in board is 0, belongs to 15 companies.
In the women in board independent variable of the research sample companies, the
average value is 0.0607 with a standard deviation of 0.102. The highest score on woman
in board is 0.333, belongs to PWON in 2014, 2015, and 2016, as well as GGRM in 2013.
Meanwhile, the lowest score of women in board is 0.
In the size of the board independent variable of the research sample companies, the
average value is 5.90 with a standard deviation of 2.04. The highest score on the size of
the board is 12, belongs to JSMR in 2016 and INCO in 2013, 2014. Meanwhile, the lowest
score on the size of the board is 3, belongs to PWON, HEXA, SMR, AKRA in 2012-2016
and SCMA in 2012.
4.2. Panel data regression analysis
Table 3: Ordinary Least Square Model.
Model 1: Pooled OLS, using 135 observations
Included 27 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 5
Dependent variable: ESGDISCLOSURE
Coefficient p-value
Const. 16,0939 < 0.0001 ***
FINANCIALLEVERAGE −2,16902 0.0007 ***
EMRES −4265,59 0.7530
WOMENONBOARD −33,0299 0.0011 ***
SIZEOFTHEBOARD 2,57479 < 0.0001 ***
Based on Table 3 above, this research model has a P-value of 1.21e-09. The value of
P-value indicates that the model is fit and can be used to test hypotheses. This study





uses the 2 best models to be used, namely Pooled Effect Model and Random Effect
Model.
Table 4 Random effects
Model: Random-effects (GLS), using 135 observations
Table 4 Hypothesis Testing
Model: Random-effects (GLS), using 135 observations
Hausman test statistic: 
 H = 4,43403 with p-value = prob(chi-square(4) > 4,43403) = 0,350441 
(A low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the random effects 
model is consistent, in favor of the fixed effects model.) 
Figure 2: Hausman test statistic.
Included 27 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 5
Dependent variable: ESGDISCLOSURE
Table 4
Coefficient Std. Error p-value
Const. 16,0939 3,65230 < 0.0001 ***
FINANCIALLEVERAGE −2,16902 0,620904 0.0005 ***
EMRES −4265,59 13524,7 0.7525
WOMEN ONBOARD −33,0299 9,92746 0.0009 ***
SIZEOFTHEBOARD 2,57479 0,489634 < 0.0001 ***
Note: *** = Sig 1%
Source: Output Gretl.
Table 4 presented the hypothesis tests between dependent variable and indepen-
dent variables. The relation shows that only H2 not accepted.
5. Conclusion
Corporate social responsibility activities are increasingly gaining attention from the
investors, customers, suppliers, employees and governments around the world (Kabir
and Thai, 2017). Therefore, many companies have shown a higher interest in reporting
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 164
3rd ICEEBA
their social responsibilities and initiating CSR activities (Setiawan, 2016). CSR perfor-
mance is considered well implemented if it is carried out by the company with the
purpose to meet the stakeholders’ expectations. The advantage gained by companies
that implement CSR is that the companies becoming more competitive in the market.
CSR becomes a strategy for companies and can serve as an effective communication
tool between the companies and stakeholders. This is because not all field activities
carried out by companies can be known by the stakeholders.
ESG disclosure comprises sustainability performance and represents information that
communicates whether a company is working to achieve sustainability goals (Bradford
et al., 2017). From Bloomberg’s ESG performance scores, companies can assess their
own company practices in the environmental, social, and corporate governance aspects
by utilizing publicly available data, annual reports and sustainability reports, direct com-
munication, press release, third-party research and the news (Tamimi and Sebastianelli,
2017).
Results of this research show that financial leverage, earnings management (modified
Jones model) and women in board (percentage) negatively influences ESG disclosure,
while the size of the board positively influences ESG disclosure. This research is based
on the Bloomberg ESG disclosure database. (modified Jones model).
A good disclosure of ESG can improve the company’s reputation, so that the prac-
tice of earnings management carried out by the company is ignored by stakeholders
(Martinez-Ferrero, Banerjee and Gracia-Sanchez, 2014).
The limitations of this study are the sample of companies from Bloomberg’s ESG
disclosure database. This research extends from the previously conducted research on
the inclusion of ESG disclosures in Indonesia.
References
[1] Achima, M. V. and Borlea, S. N. (2015). Developing of ESG score to assess the non-
financial. Procedia Economics and Finance, vol. 32, pp. 1209–1224.
[2] Al-Shaer, H., Salama, A., and Toms, S. (2017). Audit committees and financial reporting
quality: Evidence from UK environmental accounting disclosures. Journal of Applied
Accounting Research, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 2–21.
[3] Ali, M. (2018). Determinants and consequences of board size: Conditional indirect
effects. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society,
vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 165–184.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 165
3rd ICEEBA
[4] Andrade, G. and Kaplan, S. N. (1998). How costly financial (not economic) distress?
Evidence from highly leveraged transactions that become distressed (NBERWorking
Paper).
[5] Bajic, S. and Yurtoglu, B. (2018). Which aspects of CSR predict firm market value?
Journal of Capital Markets Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 50–69.
[6] Berger, A. N. and Humphrey. (1997). Efficiency of financial institutions: International
survey and directions for future research. Journal of Operational Research, vol. 98,
pp. 175–212.
[7] Bradford, M., Earp, J. B., and Williams, P. F. (2017). Understanding sustainability for
socially responsible investing and reporting. Journal of Capital Markets Studies, vol.
1, no. 1, pp. 10–35.
[8] Brammer, S. and Pavelin, S. (2008). Factors influencing the quality of corporate
environmental disclosure. Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 17, no. 2, pp.
120–136.
[9] Branco, M. C. and Rodrigues, L. L. (2008). Factors influencing social responsibility
disclosure by Portuguese companies. Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 83, no. 4, pp.
685–701.
[10] Cormier, D. and Gordon, I. M. (2001). An examination of social and environmental
reporting strategies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, vol. 14, no. 5,
pp. 587–616.
[11] Dawkins, C. and Fraas, J.W. (2011). Coming clean: the impact of environmental
performance and visibility on corporate climate change disclosure. Journal of
Business Ethics, 100(2). 303-322.
[12] Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings
management. The Accounting Review, vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 193–225.
[13] Deegan, C. (2002). Introduction: The legitimising effect of social and environmental
disclosures—A theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 282–311.
[14] Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing
firm value in small firms. Cornell Law Faculty Publications.
[15] Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of
Management, pp. 57–74.
[16] Ghazali, A. W., Shafie, N. A., and Sanusi, Z. M. (2015). Earnings management: An
analysis of opportunistic behaviour, monitoring mechanism and financial distress.
Procedia Economics and Finance, vol. 25, pp. 190–201.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 166
3rd ICEEBA
[17] Giannarkis, G., Konteos, G., and Sariannidis, N. (2014). Financial, governance and
environmental determinants of corporate social responsible disclosure. Manage-
ment Decision, vol. 52, no. 10, pp. 1928–1951.
[18] Gray, R. and Laughlin, R. (2012). It was 20 years ago today: Sgt pepper. Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability Journal, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 228–255.
[19] Halme, M. and Huse, M. (1997). The influence of corporate governance, industry and
country factors on environmental reporting. Scandinavian Journal of Management,
vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 137–157.
[20] Healy, P. M. and Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature
and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 365–
383.
[21] Humphries, S. A. and Whelan, C. (2017). National culture and corporate governance
codes. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, vol.
17, no. 1, pp. 152–163.
[22] Husted, B. W. and Filho, J. M. D. (2017). The impact of sustainability governance,
country stakeholder orientation, and country risk on environmental, social, and
governance performance. Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 155, pp. 93–102.
[23] Isnalita and Narsa, I. (2017). CSR disclosure, customer loyalty, and firm values (study
at mining company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange). Asian Journal of Accounting
Research, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 8–14.
[24] Kabir, R. and Thai, H. M. (2017). Does corporate governance shape the relationship
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance? Pacific Account-
ing Review, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 227–258.
[25] Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B. and Siddiqui, J. (2013). Corporate governance and corporate
social responsibility disclosures: Evidence from an emerging economy. Journal of
Business Ethics, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 207–223.
[26] Maheshwari, Y. and Agrawal, K. (2015). Impact of IPO grading on earnings
management. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 142–
158.
[27] Martinez-Ferrero, J., Banerjee, S., and Gracia-Sanchez, I. M. (2014). Corporate social
responsibility as a strategic shield against costs of earnings management practices.
Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 133, no. 2, pp. 305–324.
[28] McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A., and Schneeweis, T. (1988). Corporate social responsi-
bility and firm financial performance. The Academy of Management Journal, vol. 31,
no. 4, pp. 854–872.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 167
3rd ICEEBA
[29] Mohammed, N., Ahmed, K., and Xu-Dong, J. (2017). Accounting conservatism,
corporate governance and political connections. Asian Review of Accounting, vol.
25, pp. 288–318.
[30] Olmedo, E. E., Lirio, J. M., Torres, M. J., et al. (2017). Integrating multiple ESG investors
preferences into sustainable investment: A fuzzy multicriteria methodological
approach. Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 162, pp. 1334–1345.
[31] Orlitzky, M. and Benjamin, J. D. (2001). Corporate social performance and firm risk: a
meta-analytic review. Business and Society, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 369–396.
[32] Prior, D., Surroca, J., and Tribo, J. A. (2008). Are socially responsible managers really
ethical? Exploring the relationship between earnings management and Corporate
Social Responsibility. Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 16, no. 3,
pp. 160–177.
[33] Rouf, M. A. (2018). Corporate characteristics and leverage: Evidence from
Bangladesh. PSU Research Review, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 96–104.
[34] Russell, M. (2015). Continuous disclosure and information asymmetry. Accounting
Research Journal, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 195–224.
[35] Saadaoui, K. and Soobaroyen, T. (2018), An analysis of the methodologies adopted
by CSR rating agencies, Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal,
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 43–62.
[36] Setiawan, A. (2016). Integrated reporting: Are Indonesian companies ready to do it?
Asian Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 62–70.
[37] Strange, R. and Zucchella, A. (2017). Industry 4.0, global value chains and interna-
tional business. Multinational Business Review, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 174–184.
[38] Tamimi, N. and Sebastianelli, R. (2017). Transparency among S&P 500 companies: An
analysis of ESG disclosure scores. Management Decision, vol. 55, no. 8, pp. 1660–
1680.
[39] United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common
Future. (1987).
[40] van der Laan, G., van ees, H., and van Witteloostuijn, A. (2008). Corporate social
and financial performance: An extended stakeholder theory, and empirical test with
accounting measures. Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 299–310.
[41] Velte, P. (2016). Women on management board and ESG performance. Journal of
Global Responsibility, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 98–109.
[42] Vollero, A., Palazzo, M., Siano, A., et al. (2018). Managing CSR communication: A study
of legitimacy-seeking strategies adopted by service and product companies. The
TQM Journal, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 621–637.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 168
3rd ICEEBA
[43] Wang, Z. and Sarkis, J. (2017). Corporate social responsibility governance, outcomes,
and financial performance. Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 1607–1616.
[44] Wilmshurst, T. D. and Frost, G. R. (2000). Corporate environmental reporting: A test
of legitimacy theory. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, vol. 13, no. 1,
pp. 10–26.
[45] Zahra, S. A., Priem, R. L., and Rasheed, A. A. (2005). The antecedents and
consequences of top management fraud. Journal of Management, vol. 31, no. 6, pp.
803–828.
[46] Zhong, M. and Gao, L. (2017). Does corporate social responsibility disclosure improve
firm investment efficiency? Evidence from China. Review of Accounting and Finance,
vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 348–365.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i11.4005 Page 169
